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CONFLICTS FOR SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT
ATTORNEYS: THE GOOD NEWS, THE BAD NEWS,
AND THE UGLY CONSEQUENCES
JOHN A. WALTON
I. INTRODUCTION
The good news for some sports and entertainment attorneys is
that representing multiple clients in a single transaction or in sev-
eral related transactions is not necessarily unethical, unsavory, un-
professional or impossible. The bad news is, it can be all of the
above. The ugly consequences arise when attorneys fail to prepare
themselves and their clients for multiple representations that carry
potential conflicts of interest.
Attorneys are often unprepared for these representations be-
cause they assume that they are somehow immune from such con-
flicts, or that they are protected by a simple conflict of interest
waiver letter.1 It is true that multiple-client representations do not
necessarily violate ethical rules.2 However, clearing the conflicts in-
herent in such representations with nothing more than a simple
waiver letter may not satisfy ethical requirements if the representa-
tion is challenged. This article proposes that an attorney can ob-
tain adequate protection not from a waiver letter, but rather from
the process of explaining his role as a multiple-client representative
and by obtaining the clients' informed consent. During that pro-
cess, the attorney must meet with the clients to determine whether
the clients and their interests present conflicts of interest which
render multiple-client representation inappropriate. 3 To that end,
this article provides a brief review of the ethical rules governing
attorney representation of multiple clients in a single or related
1. See Richard E. Flamm & Joseph B. Anderson, Conflict of Interest in Entertain-
ment Law Practice, Revisited, 14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3 (1996) (noting erroneous
perception among some entertainment attorneys that they do not need any waiv-
ers or only need conflict letter, and recounting several instances in which attorneys
have been sued for engaging in conflicting representations without proper disclo-
sure, waiver or consent).
2. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1995) (herein-
after MODEL RULES) (which specifically anticipates and addresses issues arising in
multiple-client representations).
3. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 (1995) (requiring attorneys to consult each
client about common representation and to assess feasibility of serving all client
interests in such representation. For the text of Rule 2.2, see infra note 37 and
accompanying text).
(259)
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transactions and suggests a process for cautiously avoiding inherent
conflicts.
Section II provides a brief review and discussion of the relevant
rules and terminology pertinent to multiple-client representation. 4
Section III discusses the preparation attorneys should make when
considering representation of clients with potential or actual con-
flicts of interest.5 Section IV discusses the client consultation re-
quirements and offers suggestions for informing the client about
how his or her representation is affected when the attorney repre-
sents multiple clients.6 Section V provides suggestions about the
actual conflict consent or waiver letter.7
II. THE RuLEs RELATED TO REPRESENTING MULTIPLE PARTIES
As of June 1997, forty-one jurisdictions base their ethical stan-
dards for attorney behavior regarding conflicts of interest and mul-
tiple-client representation on the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules), drafted by the American Bar Association
(ABA) .8 The remaining jurisdictions base their rules regarding
conflicts of interest on the ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (Model Code) or on ethical standards which track
neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules. 9 Whether based on
the Model Rules or on the Model Code, individual jurisdictions
4. For a discussion of the relevant rules and terminology pertinent to multi-
ple-client representation, see infra notes 8-50 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the preparation attorneys should undergo when consid-
ering representation of clients with potential or actual conflicts of interest, see
infra notes 51-86 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the client consultation requirements and for sugges-
tions on informing the client about the changed nature of representation in multi-
ple-client representations, see infra notes 87-143 and accompanying text.
7. For suggestions about the actual conflict consent or waiver letter, see infra
notes 144-91 and accompanying text.
8. See ABA COMPENDIUM OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STAN-
DARDS 517 (1997) (hereinafter COMPENDIUM). According to the Compendium, 39
states plus the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have adopted the Model
Rules. See id.; see also ANNOTATED MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Chair's
Introduction at xii (3d ed. 1996) (noting that the Model Rules are intended to
serve as a national framework for standards of professional conduct) (hereinafter
ANNOTATED MODEL Rules); Note, Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the
Legal Profession, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1244, 1249 (1981) (noting that before issuance of
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT in 1983, courts in every state except
Maine and Mississippi had followed MODEL CODE).
9. See COMPENDiUM 517, at 7-8 (1997) and inside back cover. Other states, like
New York, base their ethics rules on the MODEL CODE OF PROFEsSIONALREsPONSI-
BILrIY, which was the predominant source for ABA standards of ethical conduct
between 1969 and 1983. See id. at inside back cover. California has adopted ethi-
cal standards which do not track the Model Rules or Model Code. See id.
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often modify the ABA language when their local ethics rules are
enacted. 10
Under the Model Rules, Rule 1.7 addresses conflicts of interest
generally and describes the circumstances under which conflicting
representations can be undertaken." Rule 1.8 limits an attorney's
participation in business transactions which are adverse to a client's
interests.' 2 Rule 1.9 addresses conflicts involving former clients
and limits an attorney's ability to represent new clients in matters
which directly conflict with former clients' interests.1 3 Rule 2.2 de-
scribes the circumstances under which an attorney may accept com-
mon representation of two or more clients in a single transaction or
several related transactions. 14 Rule 2.2 identifies an attorney's role
in such representations as an intermediary between clients and,
without specific definition, refers to this type of representation as
"intermediation."' 5
10. See id. at 10. According to the COMPENDIUM:
The Model Rules are intended to serve as a national framework for imple-
mentation of standards of professional conduct.... Undoubtedly, there
will be those who take issue with one or another of the Rules' provi-
sions.... [T] he Model Rules, like all model legislation, [was expected to
be] subject to modification at the level of local implementation.
Id. at 10.
11. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 (1995). For text of Rule 1.7, see infra note 31
and accompanying text.
12. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.8 (1995). Rule 1.8 provides in part:
Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other inter-
est adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the inter-
est are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can
be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
Id.
13. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES Rule 1.9. Rule 1.9 provides in part:
Conflict of Interest: Former Client
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the inter-
ests of the former client unless the former client consents after
consultation.
14. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 (1983). For the text of Rule 2.2,
see infra note 37 and accompanying text,
15. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 (1983).
3
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Unlike the Model Rules, the Model Code did not specifically
address multiple-client representation. 16 Sections DR 5-105 (A), (B)
and (C) of the Model Code govern conflicts encountered prior to,
or in lieu of, a state's adoption of the Model Rules. 17 Notwithstand-
ing these Model Code provisions, Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2 have
been identified as the most relevant for examination of multiple-
client representations; therefore, they are the focus of this
discussion. 18
Model Rule 1.7 directly applies to general conflicts of interest
between current clients, when intermediation is not selected. 19 In
addition, Rule 1.7 supplements Rule 2.2 in guiding the attorney's
decisions in determining which types of clients and transactions
should not be considered for intermediation. 20 Model Rule 2.2 was
specifically drafted to address intermediation, referring to it as a
special type or "special case" of multiple-client representation. 21
The comments to Rule 2.2 describe the special nature of intermedi-
16. See id. commentary at 275. The comments to Rule 2.2 indicate there was
no MODEL CODE counterpart to Rule 2.2, but reference Ethical Consideration EC
5-20 and DR-105 of the MODEL CODE. See id.
17. See id. at vii. According to DR 5-105(A),
A lawyer shall decline offered employment if the exercise of his in-
dependent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely
to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment,
or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests,
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
COMPENDIUM 210 (footnotes omitted).
DR 5-105 (C) states that "a lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious
that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the
representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on
the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each." Id. In
addition, DR 5-101 (A) states, "[e]xcept with the consent of his client after full
disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional
judgement on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own
financial, business, property, or personal interests." Id. at 208.
18. SeeJohn S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers As Intermediaries: The Representation of Mul-
tiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 741, 763 (1993) (iden-
tifying Rules 1.7 and 2.2 as most relevant to multiple-client representation). As
previously noted, California's ethics rules track neither the Model Rules nor the
Model Code. See COMPENDIUM 7-8 and inside back cover. California does not have
a rule specifically addressing lawyers as intermediaries. See id. However, California's
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-310 prescribes the consultation and consent pro-
cess for attorneys representing two or more clients with potential or actual con-
flicts. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3-310 (1997).
19. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 (1995). For the text of Rule 1.7, see infra note
31.
20. See MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 (1995). For the text of Rule 2.2, see infra note
37.
21. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 commentary at 275 (1995).
[Vol. 5: p. 259
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ated representation as "common representation."2 2 The comments
further note that the Rule's drafters might have used the term
"common representation" to emphasize the commonality of inter-
est that is required of clients in intermediated representation. 23
Common interests among intermediation clients also distinguishes
intermediation from other conflict situations. 24
According to Rules 1.7 and 2.2, an attorney may proceed with
conflicting representations or intermediations only after obtaining
the clients' consent and only if she "reasonably believes" that none
of the clients' interests is likely to be compromised by the represen-
tation. 25 However, this admonition in the Rules is misleadingly sim-
ply because it essentially ignores the possibility that the attorney's
judgment may be clouded when evaluating the clients' conflicting
interests. 26 Moreover, it provides no hint of how complex the con-
sent to conflict process can be.
Sports and entertainment attorneys frequently encounter rep-
resentations where the conflicts associated with multiple-client rep-
resentation are subtle and appear insignificant when the
representation is first considered. In reality, sports and entertain-
ment transactions are often complex and involve clients occupying
disparate positions. For example, attorney Peter L. Haviland re-
cently noted that multiple-client entertainment transactions are so
complex that using a standard letter for clearing such conflicts is
virtually useless.2 7
These Rules fail to adequately distinguish intermediation from
other, more traditional attorney-client relationships. Indeed, Rule
2.2 is mysteriously devoid of a definition of intermediation, which
would assist practitioners in distinguishing intermediation from
22. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 2.2 cmt. 1 (1995). In acting as an intermediary, the
lawyer seeks to "establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable
and mutually advantageous basis . . . ." Id. cmt. 3.
23. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 cmt. (1983).
24. For a comprehensive history of the development of Rule 2.2, see generally
Dzienkowski, supra note 18.
25. See MODEL RuLES Rules 1.7, 2.2 (1995).
26. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACrICE OF LAW 76-86 (1978)
(discussing problems lawyers face when evaluating incompatible needs of clients).
27. See Peter L. Haviland, Presentation at the Black Entertainment and Sports
Lawyers Association (BESLA) 17th Annual Conference (Oct. 30, 1997). Mr. Havi-
land, a partner practicing entertainment law at the Los Angeles office of Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, was a featured speaker on BESLA's program
entitled Unique Legal and Ethical Issues Facing Sports and Entertainment Attorneys. See
id.
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more traditional conflicts under Rule 1.7.28 The Rules also fail to
provide sufficient guidelines in evaluating a potential multiple-cli-
ent representation, consulting with the clients, and documenting
the attorney-client agreements prior to accepting and commencing
the work.
A better process for clearing conflicts requires the attorney to
focus more attention on the characteristics of the transaction and
the clients who will be involved in the intermediation if, after evalu-
ating these characteristics, all agree that intermediation is appropri-
ate. Both Rules 1.7 and 2.2 have been criticized for not providing
enough assistance to the attorney during this evaluation process. 29
Nonetheless, it is important to understand Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2
because courts rely on them, to varying extents, as the basis for eval-
uating the attorney's performance if a dispute arises between an
attorney and her clients. 30 Therefore, a preliminary review of the
Rules is appropriate.
A. Model Rule 1.7
Model Rule 1.7 provides a general standard for lawyers analyz-
ing the propriety of representing multiple clients with adverse inter-
ests. 3 1 Under Rule 1.7, lawyers can proceed with the representation
28. For discussion of a proposed definition of intermediation, see infra notes
59-60 and accompanying text.
29. See Dzienkowski, supra note 18, at 763-78 (noting that Rule 2.2 fails to
address fundamental issues about multiple-client representation).
30. Compare Kizer v. Davis, 369 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ind. 1977) (quoting Model
Code's preliminary statement distinguishing violation of Model Code's Discipli-
nary Rules, which calls for liability, from violation of Ethical Considerations, which
is merely aspirational in character) with Committee on Prof'1 Ethics v. Behnke, 276
N.W.2d 838, 840 (Iowa 1979) (noting that lawyers should view Canons as profes-
sional obligations, not aspirations, and that violation of Ethical Consideration war-
rants liability). The Kizer court held that only a violation of a Disciplinary Rule,
and not a violation of a Canon or Ethical Consideration, will lead to liability. See
Kizer, 369 N.E.2d at 444. The Behnke court held that a violation of an Ethical Con-
sideration will lead to liability. See Behnke, 276 N.W.2d at 840.
31. See Rule 1.7, which states:
Conflict of Interest: General rule
(a) a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that cli-
ent will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not ad-
versely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that cli-
ent may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to an-
other client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and
[Vol. 5: p. 259
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of multiple clients if they "reasonably believe" the representations
will not be adversely affected.3 2 Rule 1.7 is intended to provide the
attorney with guidance as to which types of conflicting representa-
tions are appropriate to pursue.3 3 However, the comment to Rule
1.7 provides a difficult standard for an attorney to satisfy in deter-
mining whether it is appropriate to "reasonably believe" that he can
accept the conflicting representation or request that the client con-
sent to the conflict.3 4 Basically, it states that "when a disinterested
lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the rep-
resentation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot
properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the
basis of a client's consent."35 This standard presumes that any attor-
ney with interests in multiple clients and a potential role in multi-
ple representations can be completely impartial in evaluating
whether it is proper to seek consent to the conflicting representa-
tions. Therefore, the attorney should be alert about issues which
arise while obtaining the client's consent. Awareness of these issues
will help the attorney and the clients make an informed decision as
they proceed in the consent process.
B. Model Rule 2.2
Model Rule 2.2, which specifically contemplates dual or multi-
ple representation, uses the same "reasonable belief' standard as
Model Rule 1.7 for analyzing when multiple-client representation is
appropriate. 36 Model Rule 2.2 was drafted, however, to more spe-
cifically address conflict situations in which the clients' interests,
though different, were not actually conflicting.
37
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consulta-
tion shall include explanation of the implications of the com-
mon representation and the advantages and risks involved.
MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.7 (1995).
32. See id.; see also Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doc-
trine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 823, 851 (1992). McMunigal describes the "obvious"
language of DR 5-105 and the "reasonably believes" language of Rule 1.7 as inade-
quate tests for determining the line between consentable and nonconsentable con-
flicts. See McMunigal, supra, at 871-72.
33. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 cmt. 5 (1995) (indicating that it is improper
for lawyer to seek consent to proceed with representations that are directly adverse
and those which materially limit lawyer's representation of other clients).
34. See id. cmt. 1.
35. Id. cmt. 5.
36. See id. Rule 2.2.
37. See ANNOTATED MODEL RuLEs Rule 2.2 cmt. (1983). Rule 2.2 states:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
7
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Rule 2.2 permits attorneys to accept representation of multiple
clients where a potential conflict of interest exists by virtue of the
multiple representations, provided the conditions set forth in the
Rule, primarily consultation and consent, are satisfied.38 Model
Rule 2.2 contains essentially the same precautions for representing
conflicting interests as those stated in Model Rule 1.7.39 Rule 2.2,
however, requires attorneys to perform a more detailed analysis of
whether the clients' situation is appropriate for intermediation
than does Rule 1.7.40
For example, Model Rule 2.2 requires attorneys to inform cli-
ents about the implications of retaining the attorney as an interme-
diary.41  This Rule mandates that the attorney explain the
advantages, risks and effects that the intermediation will have on
privileged communications and confidentiality for all clients. 42 The
Rule's comments caution the attorney to explain his non-partisan
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications
of the common representation, including the advantages and
risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges,
and obtains each client's consent to the common representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on
terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client
will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter
and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests
of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccess-
ful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation
can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on
other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client
concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant
in making them, so that each client can make adequately informed
decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so re-
quests, or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer
satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to repre-
sent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the
intermediation.
MODEL RuLEs Rule 2.2 (1995).
38. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAw OF LAWYER-
ING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 2.2, at 511
(2d ed. 1990) ("subtle distinction between representing clients with distinct inter-
ests ... and representing clients who, though adverse in their respective positions,
share a more compelling interest in reaching agreement as a group"). See generally
Wesley W. Horton & Kimberly A. Knox, Code to Rules, From Black and White to Grey,
62 CONN. B.J. 146, 151 (1987) ("overriding duty is to act with impartiality").
39. See HAzARx & HODES, supra note 38, at 201.
40. See Dzienkowski, supra note 18, at 745. See generally McMunigal, supra note
32; Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics in Estate Planning and Fiduciary Administration: The In-
adequacy of the Model Rules and the Model Code, 45 REc. 715 (1990).
41. See MODEL RULES Rule 2.2(a) (1) (1995).
42. See id.
[Vol. 5: p. 259
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role between the clients and that the clients, as a result, will have
more responsibility in making decisions.
43
When assessing whether to act as intermediary between clients,
the attorney is guided by Rule 2.2's prohibition on accepting inter-
mediation in certain situations. 44 However, those admonitions of-
fer guidance only for situations in which intermediation is "plainly
impossible." 45 According to the Rule, those situations are limited
to "contentious litigation," "contentious negotiation" and situations
where "definite antagonism" already exists. 46 Sports and entertain-
ment attorneys are likely to encounter multiple-client representa-
tions where none of these noted situations exist but where, upon
close examination, intermediation is clearly inappropriate. Indeed,
in some transactions, the conflicts that make intermediation so im-
practical are viewed as a conduit for putting the deal together. 47
Model Rule 2.2 also presents attorneys with a delicate balanc-
ing act with respect to confidentiality and privileged communica-
tions. The Comments to Model Rule 2.2 suggest that the attorney
"keep each client adequately informed" and simultaneously "main-
tain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. '48
One Comment admonishes, "if the balance cannot be maintained,
the common representation is improper. '49 The obvious problem
with this admonition is that keeping one client informed may simul-
taneously jeopardize the attorney's duty of confidentiality to the
other client. Absent detailed discussion, the attorney is not likely to
know in advance that a proper balance cannot be maintained. The
first indication of a balancing problem may not be seen until ten-
sions arise between keeping one client informed and preserving the
other client's confidence. Therefore, the attorney may become
aware of the problem when it is too late to avoid it.
Finally, the Rule 2.2 Comment states that the intermediating
lawyer should explain to each client that her representation will be
non-partisan and not involve the type of advocacy which the client
43. See id. at cmt. 8.
44. See id. at cmt. 4.
45. See id. at cmt. 8.
46. See MODEL RULES Rule 2.2(a) (1) (1995).
47. See, e.g., Corie Brown, That's Entertainment, CAL. LAw., June 1993, at 41
(noting opinion that clients seek out attorneys because of their conflicting connec-
tions); Barbara S. Wahl, Representation of Athletes, 11-SPG ENT. & SPoRTs LAw. 18, 19
(1993) (indicating that young athletes sometimes pick agents based on contacts
and clout in sport).
48. MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 cmt. 6 (1995).
49. Id. Comment 6 also notes the predominant view that no attorney-client
privilege attaches among clients in multiple-client representations. See id.
9
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would "normally expect."50 A better practice when consulting with
clients is to explain the nature of the representation that they will
receive in intermediation, rather than to inform them what they
should not expect.
Thus, like Rule 1.7, Model Rule 2.2 provides some basis for
considering multiple-client representations or intermediation.
However, neither Rule provides much assistance for actually clear-
ing the conflicts and establishing an appropriate relationship be-
tween the attorney and the multiple clients which complies with the
Rules. Moreover, a waiver letter is of little value if a dispute arises
between a client and attorney in these circumstances because Rules
1.7 and 2.2 state that some conflicts cannot be waived, even with
client consent. Therefore, the first goal of the waiver process
should be to identify where consent is deemed appropriate. The
second goal should be to obtain informed consent from clients re-
garding intermediated representation which is not otherwise inap-
propriate or prohibited. The following sections address the
preparation of the attorney, the clients and the documents for mul-
tiple-client representations.
III. ATTORNEY PREPARATION FOR MULTIPLE REPRESENTATIONS
Adequate thought and preparation for a new case or represen-
tation should not be a foreign concept for any attorney. However,
multiple-client representation raises a number of unique issues that
warrant special consideration. 51 Unlike the typical attorney-client
relationship, multiple-client representations remain controversial
when compared to traditional representations, even though they
are recognized in the Model Rules.52 The ability of clients to truly
understand the implications of multiple-client representation when
potential conflicts of interest exist has also been debated. 53
An important part of appropriately handling conflicting repre-
sentations is to develop the proper attitude toward conflicts. Even
attorneys who feel confident in their ability to handle multiple rep-
50. Id. at cmt. 8.
51. For a discussion of these issues, see infra notes 58-86 and accompanying
text.
52. See Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1247 (noting debate over pro-
priety of lawyers representing clients with conflicting interests has been raging
since inception of rules prescribing ethical attorney conduct).
53. See id. at 1247 n.3 (noting longstanding debate about whether client can
meaningfully consent to representation by lawyer with conflicting interests); see
also REPORT OF THE 16TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION
156, 165 (1910) (suggesting elimination of option for clients to consent to
conflicts).
[Vol. 5: p. 259
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resentations should exercise extreme caution before doing so. 54 In
engaging in multiple-client representations, an attorney's subjective
belief that she can represent multiple clients is not enough to sup-
port her decision to proceed.55 The unique nature of the represen-
tation warrants reflection and caution. 56 Caution is also warranted
by the fact that some courts disfavor multiple-client representa-
tions. 57 Therefore, even if multiple-client representations are an at-
torney's daily fare, each representation should be treated and
regarded as unique. The following subsections highlight some of
the unique features that need consideration.
A. Defining the Relationship
As previously noted, Model Rule 2.2 describes when an attor-
ney may act as an intermediary, but contains no definition of inter-
mediation. 58 For purposes of this article, intermediation is "a
special type of attorney-client relationship in which one lawyer
seeks to adjust the rights and responsibilities or resolve a dispute
between or among two or more clients with potential conflicts of
54. See Robert H. Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REv. 807, 826-27
(1977). In describing the degree of caution that should be used, Mr. Aronson
explained,
It is of the utmost importance that the attorney representing both parties
to a transaction reflect upon the rationales behind conflict of interest
proscriptions. It is not sufficient that the attorney believes himself able
adequately to represent potentially differing interests, or even that all par-
ties have consented. The possibility of subconsciously favoring the inter-
ests of either party, the appearance of impropriety that may arise from
even the slightest dissatisfaction, the likelihood of receiving confidential
information from one party that is damaging or helpful to the other, and
the possibility that a court will subsequently disagree with the attorney's
decision that he was able adequately to represent both interests-all dic-
tate extreme caution in these situations.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Even after undertaking multiple-client representations, the attorney should
continue to exercise extreme caution.
The lawyer may see his role as counselor or negotiator for all concerned.
At a minimum, the attorney must ensure that each understands the po-
tential conflicts and their consequences, particularly the potential neces-
sity for him to withdraw from representation of one or both and his
inability to use confidences received from any of the parties in a subse-
quent suit between them .... If the parties have not clearly understood
the lawyer's ethical responsibilities ab initio, the ensuing rancor may be
directed toward him.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., In Re Conduct ofJans, 666 P.2d 830, 833 (Or. 1983) (stating that
no amount of disclosure could make representation of conflicting interests
proper).
58. See MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 (1995).
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interest where the clients mutually agree to forego partisan repre-
sentation by separate attorneys."5 9 The lawyer, as intermediary, is
not an arbitrator or mediator but is a mutual advocate of the clients
as long as they agree to pursue mutual or consistent goals.60 This
definition is not a part of the Rules nor any court's precedent. It is
important, however, in identifying several issues which distinguish
intermediation as a special type of attorney-client relationship.
Under this interpretation of intermediation, the clients mutu-
ally agree to forego partisan representation by separate attorneys.
This is noteworthy when consulting with the clients and drafting
the agreement to proceed with intermediated representation. A
second idea introduced by this definition is that the attorney serves
as a mutual advocate of the clients' consistent goals. Thus, an attor-
ney involved in multiple-client representations should be aware of
indications that the clients' goals may be diverging. If the clients
become antagonistic in their desired outcomes, the attorney may
have to withdraw. 61
In defining intermediation and distinguishing it from tradi-
tional representation, attorneys should also consider whether the
situation is appropriate for intermediation. By considering whether
or not the situation is appropriate for intermediation, the attorney
may be alerted to issues which need to be considered before the
consultation and consent process with the client is initiated. This
analysis may also reveal impermissible conflicts which would pre-
clude intermediation.
B. Defining the Client
In addition to defining intermediation, multiple-client repre-
sentations should be further distinguished from traditional attor-
ney-client relationships by defining the intermediation client.
Justice Brandeis first characterized the difference between single
versus multiple-client representations as a difference in the client
59. John A. Walton, Lights, Camera, Consultation: Intermediation Redefined for the
Entertainment Industry, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 841, 863 (1996).
60. See id.
61. See Model Rules Rule 2.2 (1995). The Rule states in paragraph (c):
A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or
if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied.
Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the
clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation.
[Vol. 5: p. 259
12
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss2/3
1998] CONFLICTS FOR SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT ATTORNEYS 271
when he coined the phrase "lawyer for the situation. '62 In doing so,
he recognized that a lawyer representing multiple clients in a single
transaction does not merely represent the individual clients.63
Rather, the attorney's representation encompasses the clients and
their unified goals or "situation."64 Therefore, the intermediation
client is comprised of the individual clients who pursue mutual or
compatible goals.65 Such a definition acknowledges that the attor-
ney is representing individual clients. Simultaneously, it signals
that the representation is appropriate only as long as the clients'
goals and interests are consistent. As a result, the attorney must
explain that he could be forced to withdraw from representation if
conflicting interests emerge during the intermediation. 66
C. Analyzing the Transaction
Professor Geoffrey Hazard identified four factors of a transac-
tion, which he referred to as a "bargaining relationship," which
could be evaluated during consideration of a multiple-client repre-
sentation.67 These factors are: 1) the amount of money involved in
the transaction; 2) whether open-ended bargaining was involved in
the negotiations; 3) the bargaining style of the parties to the trans-
action; and 4) whether significant changes in the circumstances
were likely to occur during the execution of the final agreement.68
Specifically, Professor Hazard analyzed these factors to distinguish
"bargaining relationships" that are appropriate for multiple-client
representation from those which are not.69 Thus, for an attorney
contemplating intermediation, the intermediated representation
may be further distinguished from traditional lawyering by consid-
ering the analysis of Professor Hazard, who contemplated the multi-
62. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58-68 (1978)
(noting "that a lawyer serving more than one client in a single transaction repre-
sents 'the situation").
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Walton, supra note 59, at 863 ("The lawyer, as intermediary, is not an
arbitrator or mediator but is a mutual advocate of the clients as long as they agree
to pursue mutual or consistent goals.").
66. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 2.2(c) (1995). For the text of Rule 2.2, see supra
note 37.
67. See HAzARD, supra note 62, at 74-76.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 74. "[S]ome bargaining relationships involve irrepressible con-
flicts of interest between the parties involved .... The propriety of a lawyer's
conduct in representing 'the situation' turns on distinguishing one kind of bar-
gaining relationship from the other, but the distinction is often not very clear." Id.
These four factors help the attorney make the distinction. See id. at 74-76.
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pie-client representation long before Model Rule 2.2 on
intermediation was drafted.70
It is not clear whether Professor Hazard specifically intended
these factors to serve as guideposts for an attorney evaluating a po-
tential representation. 71 However, these factors would provide ben-
eficial guidance during the preliminary stages of a prospective
intermediation if the attorney used them as a backdrop for evaluat-
ing the characteristics and information received during the disclo-
sure and consent procedure. Unlike the Model Rules and Model
Code which focus on the ultimate result or impact of the conflicts
on the clients' representation, these factors emphasize the charac-
teristics of the transaction that the parties will pursue.
1. The Amount of Money Involved in the Transaction
Professor Hazard noted that parties to a transaction can more
easily justify hiring separate counsel when large amounts of money
are involved in the transaction. However, reduced attorneys' fees is
not the primary reason parties choose multiple-client representa-
tion in many sports and entertainment transactions. 72 The primary
motivation for most multiple-client representations is a perception
that the attorney has a special relationship with one or both parties
that will facilitate the transaction between the intermediating cli-
ents.73 Nonetheless, for purposes of evaluating the representation,
attorneys should be aware that transactions involving large sums of
70. See HAZARD, supra note 62, at 58-86.
71. Professor Hazard was the Reporter to the ABA Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards (Kutak Commission), that drafted Rule 2.2. See
Dzienkowski, supra note 18, at 763 (noting that Hazard was influential in drafting
Rule 2.2). The four factors, or their implications, are not apparent in the Rule's
text. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 2.2 (1995). The comments contain a discussion of
"contentious negotiations" which are similar to Hazard's discussion of bargaining
style, but this similarity may be coincidental. See id. at cmt. 4.
72. See Flamm & Anderson, supra note 1, at 3 (indicating that many artists and
entertainers choose their attorney based on who attorney knows); see also Brown,
supra note 47, (quoting Georgetown University Law Center Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow: "Clients want these lawyers precisely for these conflicts .. .");
Edwin F. McPherson, Conflicts in the Entertainment Industry?... Not!, ENr. & SPORTS
LAW., Winter 1992, at 5 (quoting unidentified attorney who stated, "the only rea-
son for which many potential clients come to the more established entertainment
firms is because of the firm's inherent conflicts (and therefore connections), not
in spite of them."); Michael D. Harris, Conflicts: A Boutique Problem?, L.A. DAILYJ.,
Jan. 11, 1993, at 15 (quoting Michael S. Sherman, attorney at Century City-based
Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro as saying, "[T]here's a general idea in the en-
tertainment industry that one goes to a boutique because of the clients they repre-
sent, in the hope that the lawyers will introduce one client to another client and
create something as a result.").
73. See Flamm & Anderson, supra note 1, at 3.
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money may be more complex, have longer anticipated durations
and may result in changing circumstances between the intermediat-
ing parties. Professor Hazard noted all of these as factors which can
make a transaction involving large sums of money ill-suited for com-
mon representation.7 4
2. Whether Open-Ended Bargaining Is Part of the Transaction
Professor Hazard also noted that when clients expect that their
final agreement will be the result of open-ended bargaining, the
transaction may be inappropriate for what we now call intermedia-
tion.75 Open-ended bargaining refers to a transaction in which the
final terms of the agreement will be negotiated at arms-length by
the parties.76 Hazard noted that one characteristic of this arms-
length bargaining process is the element of bluffing, which he de-
fined as "a pretense of intractability masking an undisclosed degree
of willingness to make a concession. 7 7 Hazard observed that a law-
yer representing both parties to a transaction could not represent
them during such an arms-length negotiation because he would
know each party's presumably undisclosed final position, which
would make bluffing impossible. 78 It is conceivable that a lawyer
who knows each party's willingness to compromise could thereby
more easily find their common ground. In a process or transaction
involving bluffing, however, neither client would normally expect
that his opponent's attorney would be in a position to know that a
stated position was only a bluff.79
Here again, there is an issue as to whether the attorney can
represent all parties in such an open-ended bargaining transaction
and, if such a representation is undertaken, what level and type of
disclosure is necessary before the clients can agree that one attor-
ney can represent all concerns. This problem may be self-cor-
recting because disclosing the impact of intermediated
representation on the prospect of open-ended bargaining may re-
sult in one or both clients deciding that separate representation is
necessary. 80
74. See HAzARD, supra note 62, at 76.
75. See id. at 73-76.
76. Id. at 75.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See Hazard, supra note 62, at 75 (noting that it is obvious that one attorney
cannot represent both parties when bluffing is involved).
80. See id. (noting that parties who "engage in a contentious struggle charac-
terized by posturing" are less likely to accommodate conflicting representation);
see also MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.7 (1995) (stating that lawyer must disclose impact of
15
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Another option for resolving this issue is for neither party to
disclose its ultimate bargaining position to the intermediating attor-
ney.81 However, the parties' unwillingness to fully disclose terms
and issues related to the transaction to each other or the attorney
has been considered by some commentators to raise a situation in
which intermediation should be approached with caution, if at
all. 82 Other commentators, in contrast, suggest that clients should
have the option of making less than full disclosure during the inter-
mediation.8 3 An intermediation involving limited disclosure would
require that all parties fully understand that they reserve the right
to withhold information for the purpose of negotiation from the
common attorney and to disclose only that negotiating information
as they see fit.84
3. The Bargaining Style of the Parties
Professor Hazard discussed bargaining style from the perspec-
tive of the clients during the representation. 5 From the perspec-
tive of evaluating the clients and the situation, it may be beneficial
to consider the respective clients' level of sophistication. A client
who is new to the sports or entertainment business, particularly the
athlete or performer, may know little about the issues and negotiat-
ing points in the transaction.
Pairing such a client with an experienced insider for an inter-
mediation creates a problem for both clients. Providing more in-
formation for the uninformed client should help that client
understand the value of key negotiating points. For example, a mu-
sician would benefit from knowing not to freely sign away the copy-
rights in her music. That information arguably has the inverse
effect on the established insider. The attorney, therein would be
promoting one client's interest to the detriment of the other cli-
ent's interest. This type of conflict is specifically proscribed under
conflict on representation of each client). For the text of Rule 1.7, see supra note
31.
81. See, e.g., Dzienkowski, supra note 18, at 811 (discussing various agreements
to keep certain information confidential during intermediation).
82. See id. at 813 (noting that lawyers should be cautious about agreeing to
confidentiality agreements in intermediation); see also 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,JR. &
W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RuLES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 2.2 515 & n.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1992) (noting that any
party balking at sharing confidences is an indication that multiple representation
should not be attempted).
83. See Pennell, supra note 40, at 742; see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS 729 (1986).
84. See Pennell, supra note 40, at 742; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 84.
85. HAzARD & HODES, supra note 62, at 75.
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Rule 1.7(b).86 Yet, if the seasoned client is willing to forego the
information advantage, the result could be a less one-sided transac-
tion which may promote a better long-term relationship between
the parties. The real issue is confirming that both parties under-
stand the conflict and consent to the attorney sharing the informa-
tion with the novice client.
4. The Possibility That Circumstances Will Change
In an industry where overnight sensations are frequently here
today and gone tomorrow, the potential for conflicts resulting from
changing circumstances is great.8 7 Committing an unknown talent
to a long-term deal could be disastrous for the performer if the deal
does not account for the possibility that the unknown talent may
become a sensation in short order. Conversely, the budding super-
star may never quite bloom. This can be a problem for an owner
committed to an expensive, long-term contract. Therefore, the cli-
ents must be fully informed of the risk and consent.
By considering these factors and understanding that interme-
diation is fundamentally different from other representations, the
attorney can be better prepared from the outset. Thus, when first
consulting with the clients prior to beginning the intermediation,
the attorney will be ready for the issues and processes that are likely
to occur or are expected by the clients during the intermediation.
These considerations do not replace an attorney's professional
judgment. Rather, they provide the analytical foundation upon
which to base "reasonable beliefs" that the representation can pro-
ceed without sacrificing any client's interest. By distinguishing in-
termediation from traditional partisan representation and
providing perimeters for evaluating prospective intermediation cli-
ents and transactions, attorneys can better counsel their clients
when seeking their consent for a potential intermediated
representation.
86. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.7(b) (1995).
87. See Flamm & Anderson, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that changes in circum-
stances may obviate client's prior consent to anticipated or existing conflict, if
change in circumstances alters prior conflict or raises new issues not subject to first
waiver); see also MODEL RuLEs Rule 2.2(b) (1995) (indicating that while acting as
intermediary, attorney has continuing duty to consult with clients so they will un-
derstand implications of their decisions during intermediation).
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IV. CLIENT CONSULTATION, DISCLOSURE, AND
CONSENT TO CONFLICTS
Whether the Model Rules, the Model Code or another variant
applies, the ethics rules uniformly dictate that multiple party repre-
sentations proceed only after the attorney consults with the clients
and obtains consent to the conflicting representation.8 8 It should
be noted, however, that while the Rules suggest a qualified toler-
ance of conflicting representations, client consent to conflicting
representations is a source of tension for commentators and draft-
ers of ethics rules.8 9 The difficulty lies in balancing the client's
right to select counsel against the legal institution's interests in
maintaining high ethical standards, to avoid the appearance of im-
propriety inherent in multiple-client representations. 90
Historically, the primary obstacle to resolving this issue has
been "the lack of a meaningful standard for limiting client attempts
to waive a conflict of interest."9 1 The onus for limiting client con-
sent to conflicts has typically fallen on the individual attorney, who
must decide whether to solicit consent or reject the business when
presented with a conflicting representation. 92 The ethics rules have
been criticized as ambiguous in defining when attorneys may seek
consent to conflicting representations. 9 3 These rules, however, are
consistent in their prescription that representation proceed only af-
ter consultation and client consent.94
88. See, e.g., COMPENDIUM 208-10 (discussing lawyer's obligations in conflicting
representations under DR 5-105); MODEL RULES Rules 1.7-1.9, 2.2 (1995).
89. See Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1247 n.3.
90. See Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1349-50 (9th Cir.
1981); see, e.g., Paul R. Taskier & Alan H. Casper, Vicarious Disqualification of Co-
counsel Because of "Taint," 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 156-57 (Summer 1987).
91. NancyJ. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Mul-
tiple Clients: A Proosed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L.
REv. 211, 216 (Oct. 1982).
92. See MODEL RuLES Rule 2.2(a), (c) (1995).
93. See generally Dzienkowski, supra note 19.
94. For further discussion of the consultation and consent requirement, see
infra notes 97-109 and accompanying text. See also MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 cmt. 8.
Comment 8 states that,
In acting as intermediary between clients, the lawyer is required to con-
sult with the clients on the implications of doing so, and proceed only
upon consent based on such a consultation. The consultation should
make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally ex-
pected in other circumstances.
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A. Consultation and Consent - Generally
Under the Model Rules, when an attorney "reasonably be-
lieve [s] that the client will not be adversely affected,"95 he may pro-
ceed with a conflicting representation only if the client "consents
after consultation."96 Consultation is defined in the Model Rules as
the "communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit
the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in ques-
tion. '97 Courts have held that consultation shall also include "ex-
planation of the implications of the common representation and
the advantages and risks involved." 98 Merely informing a client that
a conflict exists is not sufficient to establish consultation. 99 Like-
wise, oral consultation without a written consent is considered un-
satisfactory.100 Moreover, absent adequate consultation there can
be no consent. 10 1
The significance of securing adequate consent after fully dis-
closing all of the implications of a conflicting representation was
underscored in In re Shannon.'° 2 In Shannon, the court held that it
need not consider whether the attorney was reasonable in ac-
cepting the representation, because the consent was improper as a
result of insufficient disclosure.103 What constitutes full and com-
plete disclosure will necessarily be determined by the circumstances
and tailored to the level of sophistication and experience of the
95. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(a)(1) (1995).
96. Id. at (a) (2). The Model Code language states "[e]xcept with the consent
of his client after full disclosure ...... ANNOTATED MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 com-
mentary at 108 (1983).
97. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 commentary at 11 (1983).
98. In Re Shannon, 876 P.2d 548, 556 (Ariz. 1994) (adopting wording of Ethi-
cal Rule 1.7(B)).
99. See, e.g., In Re Shannon, 876 P.2d at 558. The Shannon court stated that,
"[a] mere mention of the possibility of a conflict of interest, without more, is not
sufficient to meet the requirements of the ethical rules." Id.
100. See Blecher & Collins, P.C. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1442,
1451 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (noting requirement for informed written consent).
101. See Conrad v. Rood, 862 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Ky. 1993). The court held,
"[t]here was no consent after consultation, because there was no consultation, nor
could there be under the circumstances here presented. There could be no con-
sent because McKinstry had an obligation under the rule to withdraw from repre-
senting both." Id.
102. See In Re Shannon, 876 P.2d at 558. In Shannon, the attorney informed
client A of the possibility of a conflict of interest arising, and that in such event he
could no longer provide representation. See id. The court noted that the attorney
failed to explain the concept of a conflict of interest, the type of conflict that might
arise, or the benefit or detriment of such dual representation. See id. The court
also stressed that this type of dual representation could possibly constrain the at-
torney from raising certain defenses on the part of client A. See id.
103. See id.
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particular client.10 4 In Financial General Bankshares Inc. v Metzger,10 5
the federal district court noted, "[flull disclosure means just [the]
affirmative revelation by the attorney of all the facts, legal implica-
tions, possible effects, and other circumstances relating to the pro-
posed representation." 10 6 The fact that a client has "knowledge of
the existence of his attorney's other representation does not alone
constitute full disclosure."1 0 7
Conflict waiver may also be attacked as an abuse of the fiduci-
ary relationship between attorney and client. Waivers are contracts,
and are thus governed by the law and principles of contracts. Gen-
erally, a waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a
known privilege or right.'0 8 However, the very fact that some sports
and entertainment attorneys are marketing their conflicts as the
way to get the deal done suggests that the conflict waivers are not
wholly voluntary. 10 9 The conflict waiver may thus be invalidated,
because if using a particular attorney is the only method for getting
the "deal" done, then the waiver may have been procured through
undue influence. In such situations, the validity of the waiver may
be questioned because of the fiduciary relationship that exists be-
tween attorney and client.11 0
104. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
372 (1993).
What is required for consultation or full disclosure will, of course, turn on
the sophistication of the client, whether the lawyer is dealing with inside
counsel, the client's familiarity with the potential conflict, the longevity of
the relationship between client and lawyer, the legal issues involved and
the ability of the lawyer to anticipate the road that lies ahead if the con-
flict is waived.
Id.
105. 523 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1981).
106. 523 F. Supp. at 771; see also Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund &
Belom, 392 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). The court stated:
What facts must be revealed depends on the circumstances. When an
attorney represents two clients with divergent or conflicting interests in
the same subject matter, the attorney must disclose all facts and circum-
stances which in the judgment of a lawyer of ordinary skill and capacity,
are necessary to enable his client to make a free and intelligent decision
regarding the representation.
Id.
107. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. at 771.
108. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938) (remanding criminal
conviction to determine if defendant competently and intelligently waived his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
109. See Brown, supra note 47, at 42 (noting that some clients do not under-
stand waiver issues arising in conflicting representation).
110. See Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that
attorney who was officer in subject managerial and publishing company breached
fiduciary duty to singer in failing to advise singer to seek outside counsel with
respect to recording, publishing and managerial contracts).
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Some entertainment and sports attorneys have characterized
themselves as "access providers," acting more like agents than attor-
neys. 111 However, the fact that an attorney acts as an agent for the
client does not relieve the attorney of an ethical obligation of ut-
most loyalty to the client.11 2 Rather, the ethical obligation is just as
great. 113 While entertainment attorneys are permitted to under-
take conflicting representations once the disclosure requirement is
met, the stringent ethical obligations of disclosure, consultation
and consent may be exactly what is lacking for much of the indus-
try.114 A mere conflict of interest waiver letter, which fails to show
disclosure and informed consent to the actual and potential con-
flicts, may not be sufficient to establish informed, voluntary waiver
of conflicts of interest.115
111. See Flamm & Anderson, supra note 1, at 3 (noting entertainment attor-
neys' self perception as "power brokers" and "access providers," as opposed to
providers of legal services).
112. See, e.g., Croce, 565 F. Supp. at 890-91 (holding that attorney who claimed
he was more of conduit for plaintiff, but not his attorney, still had disclosure obli-
gations as to attorney's role in transaction); see also Michael A. Weiss, The Regulation
of Sports Agents: Fact or Fiction?, 1 SPORTS LAw. J. 329, 349 (1994) (noting that some
attorney/sports agents completely abandon their law practices to avoid ethical re-
strictions placed on practicing attorneys).
113. See Croce, 565 F. Supp. at 890-91.
114. See Flamm & Anderson, supra note 1, at 5 (noting ambiguity as to
whether conflict waiver would satisfy requirements of informed consent).
Attorneys should be aware, however, that the relevant conflict rules do
not say that in situations of multiple representations an attorney may sat-
isfy his or her ethical duties by obtaining a conflict waiver from the con-
cerned clients. What they say is that, in some situations where a potential
for conflict exists, the attorney may nevertheless be ethically permitted to
proceed with the representation as long as he or she obtains the client's
"informed consent."
Id.
115. See Brown, supra note 47, at 98 (quoting Los Angeles County Bar Presi-
dent, Richard Chernick, who noted that attorneys cannot obtain voluntary waivers
without full disclosure of all possible conflicts); see also Flamm & Anderson, supra
note 1, at 5. The relevant conflict rules do not dismiss an attorney's ethical duties
simply by obtaining a conflict waiver in a case of multiple representation. See id.
The rules simply state that in some situations, where a potential conflict of interest
is present, the attorney must obtain a client's informed consent in order to ethi-
cally proceed with the multiple representation. See id. But because this informed
consent is usually executed at the outset of the representation, prior to the exist-
ence of any conflict, they may not actually satisfy the informed consent require-
ment. See id.
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B. Disclosing the Impact of Intermediation on Traditional
Attorney Duties
The nature of intermediation requires modification of several
traditional duties between the attorney and the client. 116 The im-
pact of intermediation on these duties should be discussed during a
consultation with the clients, which ideally occurs before commit-
ting to or beginning the representation. The Model Rules and
commentators who have analyzed the Rules have identified several
areas where traditional attorney-client duties are likely to be
affected. 117
1. The Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty is not specifically defined in the Model
Rules, but they do state that loyalty is essential and fundamental to
the attorney-client relationship."18 Model Rule 1.7 indicates that, as
a general rule, the loyalty duty prohibits the representation of inter-
ests which are directly adverse to a client without the client's con-
sent."l9 Though not specifically discussed in Model Rule 2.2, the
Comments to Rule 2.2 suggest that lawyers owe a duty of impartial-
ity, rather than absolute loyalty, to intermediating clients and thus
the lawyer should not favor either client's position.1 20
The fact that sports and entertainment attorneys often deal
with multiple athletes and entertainers for short periods of time,
while their employers are long-term clients, creates a potential
problem in an attorney's effort to fulfill their duty of loyalty/impar-
tiality. 12' The Comment to Model Rule 2.2 cautions that "a lawyer
who has represented one of the clients for a long period and in a
variety of matters might have difficulty being impartial between that
client and one to whom the lawyer has only recently been intro-
116. See Flamm & Anderson, supra note 1, at 5 (noting some modifications
that should be considered in traditional relationship between attorney and client);
see also MODEL RuLEs Rule 2.2 cmt. 7 (1995) (noting that intermediation alters
ordinary partisanship that is normally present in attorney representation).
117. See infra notes 124-43 for a discussion of these modifications.
118. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 cmt. 1 (1995); see also ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES Rule 1.8 commentary at 131 (1983).
119. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 cmt. 3 (1995).
120. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 2.2 cmt. 7 (1995).
121. Telephone Interview with Reginald Brown (Dec. 26, 1997). Mr. Brown
is a Los Angeles entertainment attorney representing R&B, rap artists and produ-
cers. See id. He noted that particularly in the entertainment industry, long-term
clients often have a history of paying for legal services. See id. New clients are
often true starving artists. See id. Therefore, the attorney must guard against any
inclination to favor the more established, lucrative client. See id.
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duced."' 22 This is one of the few areas in which Model Rule 2.2
provides a concrete statement that the intermediation is im-
proper. 123 The representation of a long-term client and a new cli-
ent in intermediation clearly presents an issue that must be
discussed and resolved. Moreover, it may present obstacles to the
representation that affect other issues, beyond impartiality.
A difference in the duration of the attorney's representation of
each client may raise problems with respect to the attorney's duties
of confidentiality and zealous representation. 124 For example, an
attorney may have a greater amount of confidential information
about a long-term client than a new client. This could severely im-
pact a representation involving proprietary information where, ac-
cording to Model Rule 2.2, the prevailing position is that no
attorney-client privilege attaches among commonly represented cli-
ents. 125 Though these are not the only complications, the goal
from the perspective of the Model Rules is to alert attorneys to con-
sider all of the client factors as interrelated, rather than focusing on
the few that support what may be an incorrect conclusion, that mul-
tiple representation is appropriate. The critical issues for the attor-
ney to consider are whether the attorney can explain to the clients
that the attorney's duty of loyalty in the intermediation is owed to
all clients and their mutual goal, whether the attorney can obtain
client consent to a different type of loyalty and whether the attor-
ney can fulfill the duty of loyalty during the representation.
2. The Duties of Zealous Representation
With respect to the duty of zealous representation, Professor
Dzienkowski advocated that "a lawyer as intermediary must repre-
sent actively the interests of all the parties, treating those interests
as part of the objective of the representation ".... 126 This view is
122. MODEL RuLEs Rule 2.2 cmt. 7 (1995).
123. See id.
124. See MODEL RuLES Rule 2.2 cmt. 6 (1995). In a situation of dual represen-
tation, the attorney is still required to keep each client adequately informed and to
maintain a level of confidentiality of information exchanged in both representa-
tions. See id. This requires a delicate balance by the attorney and if the attorney
cannot maintain this balance, the dual representation is deemed improper. See id.
125. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 commentary at 274 (1983) (not-
ing that if litigation were to arise between clients, privilege would not protect any
such communication, and clients should be advised of this accordingly).
126. Dzienkowski, supra note 18, at 791. The attorney as an intermediary
must consider the needs of all its clients and treat these objectives as part of his
goal in representation. See id. This requires identifying a client's interests at the
beginning of representation, then exploring possible alternatives to the client dur-
ing the representation, and communicating these alternatives to the client. See id.
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consistent with the Comment to Model Rule 2.2, which indicates
that the attorney in intermediation has a duty of impartiality with
respect to the intermediating clients. 127 Dzienkowski also stated
that the lawyer must inquire into the intermediating parties' "un-
derstanding of which avenues they have forgone and the conse-
quences of their actions." 128 An example previously noted is the
opportunity to bluff, which may be sacrificed in intermediated rep-
resentations. 129 Similarly, clients who prefer their attorneys to take
aggressive, hard ball positions could not reasonably expect such
representation during intermediation.1 30
By inquiring into the clients' sophistication and understanding
of these issues, as well as their comprehension of the impact of mul-
tiple-client representation on those issues, the attorney is able to
evaluate the propriety of intermediation. The attorney is also able
to assess the extent and nature of explanation needed during the
consultation and consent process, in the event intermediation is
elected.
3. The Duty to Keep Clients Informed
Thorough communication of information through client con-
sultation is the basis for initiating and proceeding with intermedia-
tion. 131 Model Rule 2.2(a)(1) and (b) direct the attorney to
consult with the clients regarding the implications of the intermedi-
ation before proceeding with the representation, and to continue
consulting with the clients regarding the decisions and conclusions
they make throughout the process.' 3 2 On the other hand, sharing
information received from one client with the other violates the
Upon obtaining an agreement from clients, the attorney must explore possible
reasons for such agreement and be satisfied that the clients have fully considered
the alternatives and consequences of the pact. See id.
127. See id. at 791 n.279 (quoting language of MODEL RULES Rule 2.2(b) stat-
ing that attorney must "consult with each client concerning decisions to be made
and considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can make ade-
quately informed decisions.").
128. Dzienkowski, supra note 18, at 795.
129. See HAzARD, supra note 62, at 75. Bluffing is a critical element of the
bargaining process. See id.
130. See id. (noting that "when a lawyer is called on to bargain for a party, he
shares the party's mask and the party's secret real intentions. He obviously cannot
do that simultaneously for both parties.").
131. See MODEL RULES Rule 2.2(a)(1),(b) (1995); see also ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES Rule 2.2 commentary at 299 (1983) (noting that Rule 2.2 elaborates on
point that "caution, consultation, and consent" are required before lawyer may act
as intermediary).
132. SeeMODEL RULES Rule 2.2(a) (1), (b) (1995). For commentary regarding
required consultation with clients throughout representation, see supra note 131.
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traditional construct of the duties of loyalty and confidentiality.13 3
The attorney should consider a position with the clients wherein
information revealed is information shared.134 The clients should
be informed that the attorney is obligated to keep all clients in-
formed of all matters affecting the intermediation. 135 They should
also be informed that the disclosure is part of the attorney's repre-
sentation of all the clients and any belated demands for individual
representation may result in the attorney's withdrawal from the rep-
resentation.13 6 Client reluctance to agree to such disclosure may be
a sign that intermediation is not appropriate. 137
4. The Duty of Confidentiality
The duty of confidentiality, like the duty to inform, presents a
problem during both the consultation and performance phases of
intermediation. When representing multiple clients with divergent
or conflicting interests, disclosing confidential information about
Client A to Client B violates the attorney's duty of confidentiality to
A.13 8 Simultaneously, failing to disclose the information violates
the attorney's duty to inform Client B.139 The obvious solution to
this problem is to have the clients agree to full disclosure at the
outset of the representation. Professor Pennell notes one problem
that may arise if the clients initially agree to a full disclosure and
sharing rule, but decide subsequent to intermediation to withhold
their confidential information, rather than have it disclosed to the
other clients. 140 An existing client who is considering a new inter-
mediation that is similar to a prior representation will require care-
ful counseling about the impact of previously disclosed information
on the new matter.' 4 1 If the prior information is relevant to the
current intermediation and the existing client directs the attorney
to keep the information confidential, intermediation may be inap-
133. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 commentary at 85, 105 (1983).
134. See Dzienkowski, supra note 18, at 810 (suggesting default position in
intermediation that, absent specific agreement, information received by attorney
during representation belongs to all clients).
135. See id. at 811.
136. See id.
137. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES Rule 2.2, supra note 37, commentary at 279
(1983).
138. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 commentary at 85 (1983).
139. See ANNOTATED MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.4 commentary at 37 (1983) (noting
that lawyer is not permitted to withhold information that concerns matter for
which attorney represents client, if matter is of importance to client).
140. See Pennell, supra note 40, at 742.
141. Dzienkowski, supra note 18, at 806-07.
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propriate. 142 Such conflicts are inevitable in an entertainment
practice where, for example, the lawyer represents recording artists
and a recording or production company. The attorney will repre-
sent different artist clients, but the same company client. Over
time, the attorney may learn the full spectrum of negotiable points
with the company client, but that company client will expect to cut
different deals with different artists based on the value the company
places on the artist. The company will, therefore, expect the attor-
ney to maintain its confidence about the negotiability of certain
points. This problem might be exacerbated if artists are selecting
the attorney because she has the record company connection. 143
Detailed consultation and consent procedures are necessary if mul-
tiple-client representation is even considered under these types of
circumstances.
V. THE PROPER CONTENT FOR THE INFORMED CONSENT LETTER
Authors such as Joseph B. Anderson and Darryl D. Miller stress
the need for entertainment attorneys to obtain conflict waivers
before undertaking the representation of multiple clients.144
Within the entertainment bar, conflict waivers are being used more
frequently than in the past.1 45 Merely obtaining a written waiver by
itself, however, may not be sufficient to shield the practitioner from
liability.146 In situations where the conflict is actual and apparent,
fully informed written waivers may nevertheless be insufficient to
continue the representation.1 47 Indeed, some courts have totally
142. See id.
143. See Flamm & Anderson, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that "many entertain-
ers and artists tend to choose counsel not on the basis of their legal track record
but on who their other clients are and who they know.").
144. SeeJoseph B. Anderson & Darryl D. Miller, Professional Responsibility 101:
A Response to "Conflicts in the Entertainment Industry ... Not!," 11 Err. & SPORTS
LAw. 8, 10 (1993). Anderson and Miller attack the position taken by Edwin Mc-
Pherson, in his refusal to acknowledge the need to obtain informed, written waiv-
ers of conflicts and potential conflicts of interests. See id. at 10. They note that
obtaining conflict waivers is the minimum professional duty of the attorney, stating
"[it is one of our highest ethical duties to inform clients of their full panoply of
options and provide them with the ability to make fully informed decisions regard-
ing the exercise of those options." Id. at 10. For a discussion of the position taken
by Edwin McPherson, see McPherson, supra note 72.
145. See Brown, supra note 47, at 40 (noting statement by Kenneth Ziffren that
"everybody" is obtaining conflict waivers).
146. For an example of where a waiver in itself is not enough, as a result of
insufficient consultation, see supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
147. See Brown, supra note 47 at 40 (citing Los Angeles County Bar Associa-
tion Formal Op. No. 471).
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forbade waiving actual conflicts. 148 The situation likely to present
itself to practitioners is a waiver that would usually be valid, but is
invalid because of insufficient disclosure and because of the nature
of the relationship between attorney and client. To address this
problem, the attorney should follow detailed consultation proce-
dures similar to those outlined above, keeping in mind that the
Rules call for informed consent.149 The attorney can then follow
up the consultation and disclosure with a consent letter, that re-
flects the detailed consideration the attorney and the clients have
given to the multiple-client representation.
The Practicing Law Institute (PLI) has outlined ten types of
information which should be included in a general conflict of inter-
est waiver letter.' 50 According to the PLI, the letter should cover
the following areas of information:
1. The matter(s) in which you represent the other party.
This representation must be thoroughly described.
2. Whether this representation [described in number 1] is
on a regular basis.
3. Whether you expect to continue to represent the other
party in the future.
4. Describe the relationship of the other party to the pres-
ent matter.
5. Whether any matter that you have worked on for the
other party is substantially related to the present matter.
6. Whether you have received any confidential informa-
tion from this client that is related to work for the other
party.
7. Whether you have received any confidential informa-
tion from the other party that is related to the present
matter.
8. Whether you believe that the representation of the
other party by you (or your firm) would adversely affect
your ability to represent you [this client] in this matter.
148. See In Re Conduct of Jans, 666 P.2d 830, 833 (1983). As the Oregon
Supreme Court noted, "It is never proper for a lawyer to represent clients with
conflicting interests no matter how carefully and thoroughly the lawyer discloses
the possible effect and obtains consent." Id.; see also In Re Conduct ofJordan, 712
P.2d 97, 100 (1985) (noting that there could be no consent where actual conflict
existed in representing creditor and debtor at same time).
149. See MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 (a)(1) (1995) (indicating necessity for consent
to intermediation following consultation).
150. See HenryJ. Kupperman, Ethical Aspects of Disclosure and Waiver of Conflicts
of Interest, 493 P.L.I. LITIG. AND ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK, SERIES: LITIG. 129,
141-42 (Jan. 1994).
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9. That, with the client's permission, you have discussed
the matter with the other party and they have given their
consent to the representation.
10. That the client has indicated their consent to the rep-
resentation notwithstanding the conflict of interest. 15 1
In light of what has been said thus far, these ten types of informa-
tion are necessary for a multiple representation conflict waiver.
This article, however, suggests that additional matters need to be
covered by attorneys seeking waiver and consent to multiple-client
representation or intermediation involving sports or entertainment
clients.
To some extent, the different nature of an intermediated rep-
resentation would be discussed and disclosed with all concerned cli-
ents during the consultation phase of the anticipated
representation. 1 52 Having had the in-depth consultation, which
many courts have ruled is necessary for proper consent to an inter-
mediated representation, it is also critical to document that the
consultation has occurred. 15 3 The absence of documentation cre-
ates a serious problem of proving adequate consultation if a dispute
arises during the representation. Therefore, the position taken in
this article is that the waiver letter should summarize the issues cov-
ered during the consultation with the clients, indicate their under-
standing of such consultation and confirm that it indeed occurred.
Moreover, an informed consent letter should confirm the client's
understanding of the following issues, in addition to those sug-
gested by PLI:
1. Non-partisan representation
As indicated in Model Rule 2.2, the client should be made to
understand that intermediation is not the type of representation a
client would "normally expect" from an attorney. 5 4 To satisfy this
requirement, the letter should indicate that the clients understand
that the representation that they will receive is not the partisan rep-
resentation that is generally rendered by individual attorneys.
151. Id.
152. See MODEL RULES Rule 2.2(a) (1) (1995).
153. See Harry H. Scheider, Jr., An Invitation to Malpractice, A.B.A.J.,Jan. 1993,
at 100.
154. See MODEL RULEs Rule 2.2 cmt. 7 (1995) (stating that when consulting
client when attorney is acting as intermediary between clients, attorney should
make clear that attorney's role is not of partisanship normally expected in other
circumstances).
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2. Mutual goals
In relation to the requirements set forth by the PLI, describing
the impact of intermediation on partisan representation, the attor-
ney should disclose his or her role as a non-antagonistic "lawyer for
the situation."1 55 In other words, the lawyer should state that the
lawyer represents the clients and their mutual goal of reaching an
agreement in the transaction, but cannot represent either client if a
serious dispute arises regarding the formation or performance of
the agreement.
3. Open-ended bargaining
As discussed above, the attorney should disclose and confirm
that the clients understand that traditional open-ended bargaining
could be compromised by the intermediated representation. 156 In
the alternative, the attorney may wish to draft an addendum to the
conflict waiver letter which specifies the type and extent of informa-
tion which will be mutually disclosed to the intermediating attorney
and the type of information which each party is at liberty to keep to
themselves. As previously noted, some commentators have sug-
gested that a desire by the clients to restrict disclosure is a warning
sign that intermediation is not appropriate. 157
4. Confidentiality
As discussed in the PLI materials and related to the disclosure
of information with respect to open-ended bargaining, the attorney
should include a detailed explanation of the impact of the interme-
diated representation on matters which either client considers con-
fidential. 158 Here again, planning for a separate agreement with
regard to disclosure may be necessary.
155. See HAzARD, supra note 62, at 58-68. See also MODEL CODE Rule 2.2 cmt. 4
(1995) (noting that attorney cannot undertake common representation if parties
are antagonistic toward each other in that they contemplate contentious negotia-
tions or contentious litigation is imminent).
156. For a discussion of how intermediary representation by an attorney may
differ from the normal expectation of partisan representation, see infra notes 159-
60 and accompanying text.
157. For a discussion of the problems with a client's unwillingness to disclose
information in an intermediation situation, see supra notes 134-37 and accompany-
ing text.
158. See Kupperman, supra note 150, at 142 (noting that waiver letter should
include any confidential information from other party in relation to matter of
representation).
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5. Impartiality
As noted, the Comments to Model Rule 2.2 indicate that the
intermediating attorney owes the clients a duty of impartiality.159
This duty differs from the traditional duty of loyalty that accompa-
nies partisan representation by separate attorneys. 160 This differ-
ence should also be noted in the conflict letter which has been
signed and understood by the client.
6. Summary
Finally, the waiver letter should summarize and confirm any
specific issues discussed by the clients and the attorney during the
disclosure process, inform or shape the clients' understanding of
the nature of the representation and the respective roles of all par-
ties involved.
With these factors in mind, it might be appropriate to examine
a sample waiver letter and consider what would be required to
make it an informed consent to multiple-client representation. The
following letter addresses a specific, and very limited, type of en-
tertainment-related conflict situation.
[Date]
[Address]
Re: Waiver of Potential Conflict of Interest
Dear lack
ill Band has asked us to obtain the necessary
licensing and copyrights in connection with its "Up a Hill"
compact disc. This requires obtaining for .ill Band a
compulsory mechanical license from you, and advising
you regarding registering copyrights, in connection with
your original works and arrangements that appear on the
"Up a Hill" compact disc. We feel that this situation may
present a potential conflict of interest if a dispute arises
between .jill Band and you regarding the license or
ownership of the copyrights. We do not believe that advis-
ing you in these matters will adversely affect the interests
of Jill Band. However, we have explained to you that in
the event that a dispute arises regarding these matters,
159. For a discussion of the duties of impartiality, see supra notes 120-23 and
accompanying text.
160. For a discussion of an attorney's duty to consult his client on this varia-
tion from traditional representation, see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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[Law Firm] cannot represent you in this matter (the
dispute).
[Law Firm] cannot represent you in this matter until Jill
Band and you waive any possible conflicts of interest that
may arise from [Law Firm] 's representation of both par-
ties. We also are hereby advising you that you have the
right to retain independent counsel to review this consent
letter before consenting to [Law Firm]'s advising you in
the matters described above.
[Law Firm] can advise you if you consent to the waiver of
this conflict of interest. You may waive such conflict by
signing the original copy of this letter and returning it to
me at the above address. We also have enclosed an extra
copy for you to keep.
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to
call.
Very truly yours,
[Name]
[Law Firm]
Having read this letter and understanding that I am waiv-
ing any conflicts of interest that may arise by [Law Firm] 's
representation of both mysel and Jill Band, I waive such
conflicts of interest so that [Law Firm], [Names of individ-
ual attorneys working on matter] or any other member or
associate of [Law Firm] may assist me in executing a
license for, and obtaining copyright registrations for, his
original works and arrangements that appear on Jill
Band's " Up a Hill " compact disc with respect to future
work and arrangements. I understand that I have a right
to retain independent counsel to review this consent
agreement.
[Name]
Date: 161
In evaluating this sample letter, a preliminary and perhaps ob-
vious observation is that in multiple representations, all of the cli-
ents involved in the transaction must waive their concomitant
conflicts with each other.162 Therefore, each client will receive a
similar, but not necessarily identical, waiver letter. The differences
161. Kupperman, supra note 150 (names added).
162. See MODEL RULES Rule 2.2(a)(1) (1995).
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in the letters would reflect the differences in each clients' initial
position and the various rights which might be affected.1 63
Using the criteria set out by the PLI, one of the first areas of
information an attorney should address in a conflict of interest
waiver letter to a client is the matter in which the attorney repre-
sents the other party.164 In this sample letter, the first sentence ex-
plains that the other party has asked the attorney to obtain the
necessary licensing and copyrights. Although this gives the client a
general idea of the nature of the matter in which the attorney is
representing the other party, attempts should be made to discuss
the matter more thoroughly. 165 For example, the attorney should
thoroughly describe both the nature of her representation with all
involved clients, and explain the reason the other party needs the
licensing and copyrights for its compact disc. 166
The second piece of information discussed in the PLI guide-
lines, whether the representation described above is on a regular
basis, is omitted from the sample letter.167 The letter should in-
clude an explanation stating when the representation of the other
party will conclude, or whether representation will continue
indefinitely.168
Likewise, the third area of information, whether the attorney
expects to continue to represent the other party in the future, is
absent as well. 16 9 The attorney should give each client involved in
the intermediation an explanation of whether she expects the rep-
resentation to be continuous for one or more of the intermediating
clients, or limited to the specific transaction at hand.
The fourth area of information which should be included in a
waiver letter is the relationship of the other party to the present
matter.170 This information is not adequately presented in the sam-
ple letter. In the letter, the attorney should explain the outcome or
consequences of obtaining the necessary licensing and copyrights
for the compact disc. In other words, the attorney should briefly
163. For example, in the sample letter Jack, as the owner of certain rights,
should have a letter which differs from Jill Band's letter as the acquiring party.
164. For a discussion of the ten steps set forth by the PLI in order to obtain
client consent, see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
165. See Kupperman, supra note 150, at 141 (noting that representation must
be thoroughly described).
166. For a discussion of the areas that should be discussed in a client consent
letter regarding a conflict of interest, see id. and accompanying text.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Kupperman, supra note 150, at 142.
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address what position the Jill Band will be in once the licenses and
copyrights are obtained and where the Jill Band would be without
those licenses and copyrights. Moreover, the letter should explain
what impact granting the license may have on Jack's rights in the
composition. For example, ifJill Band's arrangement ofJack's song
is copyrightable, Jack may be limited in his right to perform that
particular arrangement.
The sample letter also fails to meet the fifth requirement of
disclosure, whether any matter that the attorney has previously
worked on for the other party is substantially related to the present
matter. 171 If the attorney has never worked on a matter substan-
tially related to the one at hand for the other party, this should be
stated in the letter. If a prior matter the attorney worked on for
either party is substantially related to the present matter, an expla-
nation of the relationship should be included.
The sixth and seventh areas of information are closely related.
The sixth requirement of disclosure relates to whether the attorney
has received any confidential information from this client that is
related to the work for the other party.172 Similarly, the seventh
area of information addresses whether the attorney has received
any confidential information from the other party that is related to
the present matter. 173 Although the letter explains that in order to
perform the Jill Band's work, the attorney needs to obtain a com-
pulsory mechanical license from Jack, the letter should also state
whether the attorney already has confidential information provided
by Jack that pertains to the work the attorney will perform for the
Jill Band. Similarly, the letter should state whether the attorney
currently has confidential information provided by the Jill Band
that is relevant to Jack in the present matter.
The eighth area of information relates to whether the attorney
believes that her representation of the Jill Band would adversely af-
fect her ability to representJack in this matter. 174 This area is also
insufficiently addressed in the sample letter. The letter states that
"we do not believe that advising you [Jack] in these matters will
adversely affect the interests of Jill Band."'1 75 The letter, however,
does not explicitly state whether the attorney believes her represen-
tation of the Jill Band will adversely affect Jack's interests.
171. See id. at 141-42.
172. See id. at 142.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See Kupperman, supra note 150, at 142.
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The ninth area of information is that, with the client's permis-
sion, the attorney has discussed the matter with the other party and
they have given their consent to the representation. 176 The letter
does not clarify that the attorney has discussed the matter with the
other party or obtained that party's consent to representation. The
letter simply states that both clients must waive any possible con-
flicts of interest that arise before the attorney will represent them.
The tenth and final area of information articulated by the PLI
that should be addressed in a waiver letter is that the client has
indicated his consent to the representation, notwithstanding the
conflict of interest.177 This is addressed in the last paragraph of the
letter, which states that the law firm is able to advise the client as
long as the client consents by waiving any conflict of interest. 78
Furthermore, the letter instructs the client that he may waive the
conflict of interest by signing the original copy of the letter.179 The
sample letter would be strengthened by indicating that, by signing
the letter, the client is waiving the conflict. Such a statement more
clearly informs the client of the consequences of signing the letter.
In addition to the ten suggested factors set out by the PLI,
there are the five other areas of information which this article has
suggested the attorney should include in such a letter, in order to
facilitate the client's understanding of the role that the attorney has
in the representation. 80 First, the letter should indicate that when
the attorney is representing at least two clients, the client will not
receive the typical partisan representation that might be ex-
pected. 181 In the sample letter, this issue is addressed only briefly
by stating that "we have explained to you that in the event that a
dispute arises regarding these matters, [Law Firm] cannot repre-
sent you in this matter."1 8 2 The letter should include a brief expla-
nation of what a client can expect from the attorney representing
both parties, and what alternatives he has in the event a dispute
arises.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. For a discussion of the five factors set forth in this article, see supra notes
154-60 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 154.
182. This statement is also confusing in its use of the terms "these matters,"
which implies disputes, and "this matter," which implies the multiple representa-
tion. More accurately, the letter should indicate that if a dispute arises from the
intermediated matter, all clients will need separate representation for the dispute.
[Vol. 5: p. 259
34
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss2/3
1998] CONFLICTS FOR SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT ATTORNEYS 293
Second, the letter should explain that the role you will play is
one of a "lawyer for the situation."183 This issue is closely related to
the first one discussed above. The sample letter clearly states that if
a dispute does arise, the attorney will be unable to represent the
addressed client in the matter. The letter should also explain to
the client that the attorney's role in that particular matter is to rep-
resent both clients, to help them reach an agreement in the
transaction.
Third, the letter should explain to the client that there is a
possibility that open-ended bargaining may not occur if you repre-
sent both parties. 184 The sample letter fails to address this point at
all. The letter should address this issue or an alternative: draft an
addendum to the letter, which specifies the nature of the informa-
tion each party will disclose to the intermediating attorney, as well
as the information each party may keep to himself.
Fourth, the letter should disclose to the client the impact inter-
mediated representation will have on matters either party considers
confidential. 185 Fifth, similar to the second factor above, the letter
should explain that as the intermediating attorney, there is an ex-
pectation of impartiality.18 6 The attorney should clarify this in the
letter because, without an explanation, clients may expect tradi-
tional duties of loyalty between attorney and client to apply. Fi-
nally, the letter should end by summarizing specific issues which
the clients have raised and discussed with the attorney throughout
the disclosure process, which shape the clients' understandings of
the representation and the role each party has in the process.
Including these disclosures in addition to those suggested by
the PLI may solve the problem of adequate disclosure, but they si-
multaneously result in a conflicts letter which is so long and com-
plex that it may require the representation of an attorney to be
understood and explained. Indeed, there are some commentators
who suggest that clients entering into such a conflicting representa-
tion should be advised to seek independent counsel, with respect to
the advisability of accepting such a representation. 18 7 The sample
183. See HAZARD supra note 62 and accompanying text.
184. Id.
185. See Annotated Model Rules Rule 2.2 supra note 2 commentary at 274
(1983).
186. See id.
187. See Harry H. Schneider, Jr., An Invitation to Malpractice (Part II), A.B.A. J.,
Jan. 1993, at 100 (discussing suggested procedures to obtain informed consent);
see also Leonard M. Marks & Robert P. Mulvey, Ethical Aspects of Entertainment Law
Practice, 359 PLI/PAT 605, 609 (1993) (stating that it is recommended that enter-
tainer obtain independent legal advice).
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letter requires the client to acknowledge the right to seek in-
dependent counsel, but is silent as to whether the client obtained
independent advice. The letter should indicate whether separate
counsel was consulted, and if not, that the client chose to forgo that
right notwithstanding advice of the intermediating attorney. While
such a practice may appear to be overkill, there are clearly sports
and entertainment contracts which involve sufficient sums of
money and complex terms which warrant review by independent
counsel where intermediation is pursued for all or part of the trans-
action. Another possibility is to simply include the waiver letter and
review of the letter as part of the consultation process. Here, the
parties and the attorney would review the letter and approve its
terms as a group immediately prior to accepting the intermediated
representation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This discussion begs the question of whether executing a well
drafted letter or giving the clients notice of their right to seek the
advice of independent counsel will offer the intermediating attor-
ney protection if a dispute arises. As discussed above, the mere fact
that an attorney obtains a waiver from the client waiving the conflict
of interest does not necessarily mean the conflict is validly
waived.18 8 The bar has generally recognized strict professional stan-
dards, requiring that in order for a client to waive a conflict of in-
terest, the attorney must consult with the client and fully and
adequately explain "the implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved."' 8 9 While some attorneys
exult the advantages of multiple representation, 90 without full and
complete disclosure of the conflict and its implications, a knowing
and voluntary waiver may not be obtained.' 9 ' Consequently, in or-
der to minimize such a risk, the conflict letter must reflect that this
thorough consultation and consent process was completed.
188. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 372 (1993) ("The client's consent alone is not sufficient to waive present con-
flicts. A lawyer must also 'reasonably believe the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client.'").
189. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(b)(2) (1995). For the full text of Rule 1.7, see
supra note 31 and accompanying text.
190. See McPherson, supra note 72, at 5 ("the only reason for which many
potential clients come to the more established entertainment firms is because of
the firms' inherent conflicts, not in spite of them.").
191. See Brown, supra note 47, at 42 (noting that deal makers within entertain-
ment industry are not fulfilling this ethical obligation) (citing Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Professor of Law at U.C.L.A., stating that "[t ] he clients' understanding of
how deals are put together is exactly what seems to be missing.").
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